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Baseball's Third Strike: The
Triumph of Collective Bargaining
in Professional Baseball
Robert A. McCormick*
Since the inception of professional baseball, team owners have
imposed limits on the freedom of players to negotiate contract terms.
In this article Professor McCormick traces the history of attempts by
professional baseball players to obtain contractual freedoms through
the use of the antitrust and labor relations laws, attempts that
culminated with the players' strike of 1981. Although players in other
team sports successfully have utilized antitrust laws to increase
player bargaining power, Professor McCormick argues that labor law
has provided baseball players the only effective means to gain in-
creased contractual freedoms. Professor McCormick concludes that
player-owner disputes over the reserve system in baseball today fall
within the labor exemption to the antitrust laws and, therefore, that
players and owners will resolve future conflicts solely within the struc-
ture of labor relations law.
I. INTRODUCTION
For countless followers of professional baseball, as well as
team owners, players, and numerous dependent businesses, the
1981 baseball season will be remembered more for the off-the-field
strife than for the games themselves. Players engaged in a seven
week work stoppage, which brought play to a halt in the middle of
the championship season. After charges of bad faith bargaining,1
an action in federal district court seeking to postpone the strike,
testimony before the National Labor Relations Board,3 the in-
volvement of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,4 and
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., 1969, Michigan State Uni-
versity; J.D., 1973, University of Michigan. The author wishes to thank Edwin Fisher and
James McNally, class of 1982, Detroit College of Law, for their considerable assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
1. See infra note 16.
2. See infra note 17.
3. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1981, at A19, col. 1; id., July 6, 1981, at C6, col. 3.
4. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, created by the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, makes available "government facilities for conciliation, mediation and
1131
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the Secretary of Labor,5 management and labor ultimately negoti-
ated a resolution to their dispute. The agreement was the product
of collective bargaining and the economic sanctions which accom-
pany that system.
The 1981 strike was an outgrowth of the historic conflict be-
tween the reserve system' and the players' desire for full freedom
of contract. This conflict is virtually as old as professional baseball
itself. Although the 1981 strike was unprecedented in its duration
and timing, it was merely a new manifestation of the struggle be-
tween players, their unions, and team owners to resolve the con-
flict. For more than a century professional baseball players were
subject to the reserve system; employment terms that, in effect,
prevented players from seeking employment with other teams even
after the expiration of their contracts. Throughout the history of
baseball players had sought freedom from the reserve system and
the resulting incapacity to contract freely. Players attempted to or-
ganize or play for teams in new leagues that arose in competition
with established leagues.7 Players brought numerous law suits,
contending that the reserve system was an unlawful restraint on
trade.' In addition, players and others who were concerned about
the perceived imbalance of power in the employment relationship
in professional baseball called for congressional action to outlaw or
modify the reserve system.9 These efforts failed to alter the system
significantly.
During the 1970's players in all other major professional sports
succeeded in effectuating major modifications in their reserve sys-
tems, primarily through successful antitrust challenges. 10 The Su-
preme Court, however, had ruled in 1922 that the professional
voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage employers and the representatives of their em-
ployees to reach and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours and working condi-
tions." 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1976). "The Service may proffer its services in any labor dispute
in any industry affecting commerce, either upon its own motion or upon the request of one
or more of the parties to the dispute ...... "Id.
For information on the involvement of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
in the baseball negotiations of 1981, see N.Y. Times, July 17, 1981, at A15, col. 5; id., July
10, 1981, § A at 15, col. 4.
5. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1981, at 17, col. 3; id., July 17, 1981, at A15, col. 5.
6. For an explanation of reserve system restraints, see infra notes 26-34 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See infra notes 43-83 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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baseball industry was exempt from the antitrust laws.11 In 1972 the
Court reaffirmed this exemption in the celebrated Curt Flood
case, 1 2 leaving baseball alone among the professional sports beyond
the reach of the antitrust laws. As a result of this case, the law
could not impose sanctions upon the owners for collectively fixing
the terms and conditions of employment for players. Despite the
owners' success in maintaining monopoly power, baseball players,
like players in other sports, succeeded in making major inroads
upon the reserve system in the 1970's. Unlike athletes in the other
sports, however, baseball players gained concessions through the
development of the Professional Baseball Players' Association. In
1976 an arbitrator's award gave impetus to the emerging organiza-
tion and overcame a century of baseball history-effectively dises-
tablishing the reserve system. As a result of this decision and the
development of the Players' Association into a representative labor
union, management and labor in baseball have engaged in pro-
tracted and bitter negotiations over the reserve system, culminat-
ing in the 1981 strike.
The specific issue that gave rise to the 1981 players' strike was
the amount of compensation paid to a team that "loses" a free
agent player.'8 Team owners took the position that when a player's
contract with one team terminated and the player signed to play
for another team, his new team should compensate the former
team for its loss by awarding the former team a major league
player.1 4 The Players' Association was willing to accept the premise
11. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
12. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying
text.
13. A free agent player in professional team sports is a player who has completed the
term of his contractual obligation with one club and, therefore, is available for hire by other
clubs pursuant to league rules. These league rules may continue to limit a player's freedom
to choose a new team. For example, a team may possess a right of first refusal on any offer
that the player receives from another club. Moreover, if a free agent signs with another club,
the former club may be entitled to compensation from the acquiring team. Finally, a draft,
which allocates among teams the right to negotiate with available free agent players, may
limit the selection of a free agent. See J. WEIsTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 523
(1979).
14. Free agent compensation or indemnity systems have been a regular part of in-
traleague rules in sports leagues in which players may sign with teams other than their
original teams. League bylaws usually provided that if the player's original team and the
team acquiring the player's services could not agree on the type or amount of compensation
the former team should receive, the determination would be made by the league commis-
sioner, who was empowered by league rules to award either future draft rights or a current
player. In essence, the compensation is a forced trade. See J. WEiSTART & C. LOWELL, supra
1982] 1133
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that the teams losing a player should be afforded some form of
compensation. It argued, however, that the owners' formula would
discourage team owners from offering more lucrative contracts to
players who had completed their contractual obligations with other
teams.1 Team owners would fear losing a valuable member of their
roster in return. The Players' Association further charged that the
owners had failed to bargain in good faith in this dispute."l The
National Labor Relations Board first sought injunctive relief upon
the claim,17 and then commenced unfair labor practice proceedings
against the owners.18
Although negotiations took place, the two sides seemed to
grow further apart. When owners purchased strike insurance,1'
players claimed that the owners' tactics and intransigence showed
their intention to "bust" the union.2 0 After weeks of stalemate, the
note 13, at 502-03. These schemes have produced much litigation. For a further discussion
of free agent compensation plans in various team sports, see Mackey v. National Football
League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robert-
son v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Foot-
ball League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
15. Players in all sports that utilize free agent compensation systems have contended
that the system operates as a restraint on player mobility. Some courts have agreed. See,
e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975). Prospective
employers face the prospect of relinquishing valuable present or future players if later they
wish to sign an available free agent. Several economists have noted that, as a result, owners
become less willing to hire available free agents than they would be if the "forced trade"
system were not in effect. See, e.g., H. DEMMERT, THE EcONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM
SPORTS 38 (1973); J. QUIRK & M. EL HODI, The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports
League, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BusiNSss 34 (R. Noli ed. 1974).
16. The Players' Association alleged that the owners had claimed an inability to with-
stand the players' free agency demands financially, but that the owners had refused at the
same time to open their books to substantiate this claim. NAT'L L.J., May 20, 1981, at 13.
This charge, if established, could have constituted a violation of § 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956). The allegation presented the first impression issue of whether conduct away from
the bargaining table by persons not directly involved in negotiations could constitute a Tru-
itt type of violation.
17. Judge Puts Off Baseball Decision, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1981, at A19, col. 2; Base-
ball Strike Off as Players, Owners Extend Deadline, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1981, at A17, col.
1; Labor Board Starts Legal Moves Aimed at Postponing Strike, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1981,
at Bl, col. 5. On June 10, 1981, U.S. District Judge Henry F. Werker denied the injunction,
saying "there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been com-
mitted." Baseball Poised for Strike as Judge Denies Injunction, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981,
at D21, col. 4.
18. Baseball Impasse: Many Sides to Story, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1981, at C4, col. 1.
19. The owners were insured against potential losses up to $50 million. Under the pol-
icy the owners received $100,000 per game after a 153 game deductible amount. Id.
20. New York Yankees player Reggie Jackson stated at the time: "I think the owners
realize they can't break the union-at least, I hope they realize that." Anderson, The Base-
ball Strike Situation, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, at D21, col. 4. A Baltimore player repre-
1134
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parties moved negotiations from New York to Washington at the
behest of the Secretary of Labor,21 who pressured the parties to
reach a settlement and salvage the season. Numerous formulae for
resolving the dispute were proposed and rejected.22 Ultimately, the
parties reached a compromise, creating a complex free agent com-
pensation scheme 3 and resolving other contract issues.24 Thus, the
events of the 1981 strike had the elements of a full scale labor dis-
pute with sophisticated and resolute principals who engaged in
protracted negotiations, endured an enormously costly work stop-
page, 2  and finally reached a complicated agreement that was satis-
factory, for the present, to all of the parties to the negotiations.
This strike, like most strikes, had effects beyond the costs incurred
by the parties engaged in the collective bargaining process. The
sentative said: "The owners apparently thought it was their last chance to break the union."
Kaplan, Let the Games Begin, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 10, 1981, at 14, 18.
21. Talks Resume in Washington, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1981, at Cll, col. 5.
22. Originally the owners had wanted to rank half of all major league players by posi-
tion. Depending upon where the player stood on the ranking list, the team signing the free
agent could protect either 15 or 18 players. The team losing the player would have the right
to select any unprotected player. The Players' Association was willing initially to rank only
five percent of all players. The Issue, id., May 25, 1981, at C4, col. 2. In July the Association
proposed sending the free agent compensation question to binding arbitration; the owners
rejected the proposal. Chronology of the Baseball Strike, id., Aug. 1, 1981, at 18, col. 4.
23. Under the agreement teams may protect 24 players each if they sign a ranking free
agent and 26 if they do not. All other players go into a "compensation pool." "Type A"
ranking free agents are those who fall within the top 20% of all players at each playing
position based on statistics of the players' two most recent seasons. "Type B" ranking free
agents are the players rated in the 20-30% category in their positions. A team that loses a
Type A player may select an unprotected player from the pool. A team that loses a Type B
player receives a draft choice from the signing team. A team losing an unranked player
receives no compensation. Baseball Strike Issues, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 18, col. 1;
Kaplan, supra note 20, at 14, 18. For a further discussion of the several proposals, see
Kaplan, No Games Today, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 22, 1981, at 17.
24. Under the agreement players received credit toward free agent status for the strike
period. The contract extended the duration of the basic agreement for one year, to Decem-
ber 31, 1984. Kaplan, supra note 20, at 17-18.
25. The strike cost the players an estimated $28 million in salaries. The clubs' losses
for the 713 unplayed games were approximately $116 million. The owners' insurance policy
paid $44 million, leaving a net loss of $72 million. Kaplan, supra note 20, at 17; Strike Over,
Baseball Resumes Aug. 9, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Dave Winfield of the
Yankees lost approximately $338,500 in salary. Strike Losses Heavy and Widespread, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 17, col. 3. The major league cities also suffered considerable losses.
The Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce reported losses of $75,000 to $100,000 for each
home game that the Phillies failed to play. Each game missed at Boston's Fenway Park cost
the city $18,000 in taxes and $650,000 that fans ordinarily would have spent in and around
the stadium. The Mayor of Cincinnati said: "Our local estimate is that for each game not
played the community loses $900,000 in money not spent." Id. New York City's comptroller
estimated that the strike cost the city at least $8,400,000 in lost business and wages. City's
Loss Put at $8.4 Million, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 19, col. 2.
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willingness of both owners and players to incur those pressures at-
tests to the difficulty of resolving the ancient conflict at issue.
The free agent compensation controversy is only one aspect of
the genuine issue that has separated players from owners. For
more than a century, baseball's reserve system has bound profes-
sional baseball players. The reserve system in the past included
several components that limited both the ability of owners to nego-
tiate for players and the right of players to contract freely. Team
owners by agreement circumscribed their own capacity to trade in
players through the draft,26 the no-tampering rule,2 7 and blacklist-
ing sanctions.28 The assignment clause,29 the compensation rule,30
26. Under the draft owners allocate available players among teams, usually in reverse
order of the team's previous year's performance record. Once a team drafts a player, the
drafting team holds the exclusive right to contract with that player. Leavell & Millard,
Trade Regulation and Professional Sports, 26 MERCER L. REV. 603, 610-11 (1975); Pierce,
Organized Professional Team Sports and The Antitrust Laws, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 566, 603
(1958); Note, The Battle of the Superstars: Player Restraints in Professional Team Sports,
32 U. FLA. L. REv. 669, 670 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Player Restraints].
27. Professional sports leagues commonly have prohibited member clubs from "tam-
pering" with players on other teams. League bylaws typically prohibit a team from negotiat-
ing or making an offer to a player who is under contract with another team. The penalties
for violating the rule may include loss of a draft choice and a fine. The justification usually
advanced for the rule is that if an athlete is negotiating with another team, he might have a
disincentive to play aggressively for his present team. Courts and commentators have dis-
agreed over the validity of this justification. See Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F.
Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974); H. DEMMERT, supra note 15, at 92.
The Bylaws of the National Basketball Association provide:
(g) Any person who, directly or indirectly, entices, induces, persuades or attempts to
entice, induce, or persuade any player, coach, trainer, general manager or any other
person who is under contract to any other member of the Association to enter into
negotiations for or relating to his services or negotiates or contracts for such services
shall, on being charged with such tampering, be given an opportunity to answer such
charges after due notice and the Commissioner shall have the power to decide whether
or not the charges have been sustained; in the event his decision is that the charges
have been sustained, then the Commissioner shall have the power to suspend such per-
son for a definite or indefinite period, or to impose a fine not exceeding $5,000, or
inflict both such suspension and fine upon any such person.
For a further discussion of the no-tampering rules, see J. WEisTART & C. LOWELL, supra
note 13, at 506; Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242, 245
(1956).
28. Under a blacklisting agreement teams agree not to negotiate with players who are
under contract with another team. See Rottenberg, supra note 27, at 245.
29. An assignment provision permits a team to assign a player's contract to another
team without the player's consent. J. WmsTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 292.
30. The compensation rule provides that any club which hires a player who has ful-
filled his contractual obligation to his former club must compensate the former employer in
the form of cash, a player, or a draft choice. Goldstein, Out of Bounds Under the Sherman
Act? Player Restraints in Professional Team Sports, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 285, 291 (1977).
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and the reserve clause31 have been parts of the uniform player con-
tracts that owners have required all players to sign. Professor
Sobel describes the consequences of the restraints of the reserve
system:
The total effect of these contract provisions and league rules was this. Once a
player signed his first professional baseball employment contract, he became
the property of his team. His contract could be renewed by the team, year
after year, without his consent and at salaries he never agreed to accept. His
only options were to play or to retire from professional baseball, because no
other team would even consider hiring him as long as he was under contract.
Further, he could be traded from team to team, with or without his consent.
If he was traded, he was as bound to the new team as he had been to the
former team, because the new team had the right to reserve him
perpetually.31
Since the implementation of the first reserve system over a century
ago, players, courts,33 and commentators 34 have criticized the servi-
tude associated with the system.
The justification for the reserve system advanced most often is
the maintenance of team competition. Team owners and commen-
tators postulate that the opportunity for players to move freely
from team to team would destroy competition and exciting play
among teams within a league.3 5 According to this theory, the own-
31. A reserve clause is a contractual provision that binds a player in perpetuity to the
club holding his contract. Allison, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Status of
the Reserve System, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 18 (1973); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859,
860-62 (1971).
32. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 91 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). For a discussion of
Gardella, see infra text accompanying note 96. In Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738,
744-45 (D.D.C. 1976), the court characterized the National Football League player draft as
"a group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form." The court found the draft to be a
naked restraint on trade with no purpose except stifling of competition. Id.
34. A January 31, 1899, editorial in the Cleveland Plain Dealer called baseball "the
most grasping and most absolutely selfish and soulless monopoly in existence." HousE SUB-
COMM. ON STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER, H.R. Doc. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL]. Representative Gallagher of
Illinois introduced a resolution calling for a federal investigation of organized baseball as a
"predaceous [sic] and mendacious trust." Id. at 49.
35. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 596; Morris, In the Wake of the
Flood, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 86, 87-90 (1973); Note, The Legality of the Rozelle Rule
and Related Practices in the National Football League, 4 FORD. URBAN L.J. 582, 587-89
(1976); Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the
Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418, 424-26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Super
Bowl and the Sherman Act]; Comment, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team
Sports, 34 U. P1Tr. L. REv. 645, 666-70 (1973).
The assumptions about the stabilizing influence of player restraints have been debated.
The district court in Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (D.
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ers' ability and willingness to pay, and, to a lesser extent, the loca-
tion of the team, would determine team quality in the absence of
an effective reserve system. Certain teams would dominate play
and alter the competitive balance, with the result that followers
easily could predict the outcome of many games. Fan interest
would wane and the industry itself ultimately would fail.36 Because
of the imperative that teams be competitive, many have argued
that traditional employee contractual freedom cannot exist within
the sports industry 3 7
This Article analyzes the history of player-owner relations in
professional baseball. Part II of the Article describes attempts by
players since the inception of organized baseball to alter the re-
serve system-the same issue that gave rise to the 1981 strike. Part
III of the Article discusses the development of collective bargain-
ing in professional baseball and the rise of the Players' Association.
Part IV of the Article analyzes the utility of antitrust laws to chal-
lenge player restraints and examines various congressional propos-
als to bring baseball under the rubric of the antitrust laws. After
describing the application of the labor exemption to the negotiated
reserve system, the Article concludes that collective bargaining and
not antitrust law must shape the contours of baseball's reserve sys-
tem in the future.
Minn. 1975) said, "the existence of the Rozelle Rule and the other restrictive devices on
players have not had any material effect on competitive balance in the National Football
League." Professor Noll comments,
A central issue in the debate about the extent to which restrictive practices are neces-
sary in sports centers on the issue of competitive balance. . . . In any systematic anal-
ysis of the competitive balance of leagues. . . there is absolutely no evidence that com-
petitive balance is accomplished by the mechanism for dealing with players.
American Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Pro Sports: Should Government Intervene?
(February 22, 1977). See H. DEMMERT, supra note 15, at 31-39; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 13, at 623-24.
36. See Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act, supra note 35, at 421; Note,
Flood in the Land of Antitrust: Another Look at Professional Athletics, the Antitrust
Laws, and the Labor Exemption, 7 IND. L. REv. 541, 572-73 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Flood in the Land of Antitrust]; Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized
Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 585 (1953).
"[Miost commentators, including those otherwise unsympathetic to the player re-
straints, have recognized that the success of a league's sports venture depends upon the
unpredictability of the outcome of on-the-field competition between clubs." J. WEISTART &
C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 595; see authorities cited id.
37. Krasnow & Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEo. L.J. 749, 751 &
n.8 (1963); Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 ME. L. REv. 459, 471
(1970).
1138 [Vol. 35:1131
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II. THE CONFLICT IN PERSPECTIVE
There was a time when the League stood for integrity and fair dealing. Today
it stands for dollars and cents. Once it looked to the elevation of the game
and an honest exhibition of the sport; today its eyes are on the turnstile. Men
have come into the business for no other motive than to exploit it for every
dollar in sight.
Manifesto of the Brotherhood
of Professional Baseball Players,
1889.30
Throughout its history professional baseball has endured bit-
ter struggles over the tension between contractual freedom and the
need for team competition. Conflict between players and manage-
ment marked the first decades of modern professional baseball
with particular severity. Initially, owners restrained the movement
of players between teams to stabilize the industry. 9 These mea-
sures, however, also brought increased profits and abuses of power
by owners. These effects, in turn, engendered frustration in players
and resulted in the creation of new leagues and "contract jump-
ing"'40 by players who wished to take advantage of competition for
their services between the leagues.41 Moreover, legal redress was
unavailable to owners for enforcement of the players' contracts. 42
Thus, these early internecine battles for players resulted in insta-
bility and financial failure for leagues as well as teams.
A. The Early Battles
Historians usually trace the beginning of modern baseball to
the adoption on February 2, 1876, of a formal constitution by the
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.4 The founders of
what is presently the National League also instituted the first stan-
dard form contract, which the founders designed to prevent play-
38. Koppett, Yesterday, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 1, 1981, at 90.
39. See infra note 44.
40. The term "contract jumping," also known as "revolving," describes the movement
of a player from one team to another either inter- or intraleague during the term of player's
contract or after its expiration but without the consent of the player's original club. Club
owners have long sought to curb the practice of contract jumping, primarily by means of the
reserve system mechanism. For information about the practice and its impact on the devel-
opment of the reserve system, see HOUSE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at
16, 19, 21-35.
41. Players have been the chief benefactors of competition between leagues for play-
ers' services. Id. at 35.
42. See infra note 65.
43. 2 NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPORTS at vii-viii (1979) [hereinafter cited as
TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA].
19821 1139
HeinOnline -- 35 Vand. L. Rev.  1139 1982
1140 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1131
ers from contract jumping." Team owners, nonetheless, engaged in
fierce bidding for talented players, which resulted in the financial
failure of eight of the original fifteen league teams by the end of
the 1879 season.46 This practice had been rampant in the earlier
league and had resulted in gross competitive imbalance. Thus, in
1879 team owners in the National League secretly agreed to adopt
the first reserve system.46 Under this agreement each team put all
of its players on a "reserve" list. Owners pledged to refrain from
hiring or attempting to hire a player on the reserve list of any
other club.47
The 1879 agreement among National League clubs was very
effective, and the prosperity that owners enjoyed 8 attracted com-
petition. In 1881 wealthy brewery owners and other backers began
a new baseball league, the American Association.49 The new league,
44. See H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, THE OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL 12 (7th
rev. ed. 1974). Contract jumping and the concomitant competitive imbalance plagued the
predecessor league. In 1875 the Boston team won 71 games and lost only eight games for a
winning percentage of .899, a percentage unequaled in the history of the game. In 1869 the
Cincinnati Redstockings played 57 games without a defeat. Moreover, because of the unbri-
dled competition for players services, player salaries accounted for two-thirds of the average
clubs expenses. No club reported profits, and between 1871 and 1875, 16 of the 25 teams in
the league failed. See Comment, supra note 36, at 586.
45. HOUSE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 21; Comment, supra
note 36, at 586.
46. J. ROSENBURG, THE STORY OF BASEBALL 24 (1972); L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 84-
89; H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 15.
47. On September 29, 1879, the owners met and then announced:
The financial results of the past season prove that salaries must come down. We
believe that players in insisting on exorbitant prices are injuring their own interests by
forcing out of existence clubs which cannot be run and pay large salaries except at a
large personal loss. The season financially has been a little better than 1878; but the
expenses of many of the clubs have far exceeded their receipts, attributable wholly to
the large salaries. In view of these facts, measures have been taken by this league to
remedy the evil to some extent in 1880.
HOUSE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra, note 34, at 22. The new agreement included
a rule that permitted each team to reserve sole rights to negotiate with five players. Id. In
1883 the rule was expanded to encompass the entire team. Id. at 24.
48. In 1881 a majority of teams showed a profit for the first time since the league's
organization. Receipts and earnings skyrocketed. Gross receipts at Philadelphia rose from
$39,583 in 1884 to $99,000 in 1887. Id. at 24-25.
49. National League team owners derisively labeled the new league the "beer and
whiskey league" because of the occupation of its founders. See H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON,
supra note 44, at 39.
The platform of the league stated:
"Honest competition, no syndicate baseball, no reserve rule, to respect all contracts
and popular prices."
All of the gentlemen present. . . strongly intimated that it was war to the finish with
the National organization.
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which was not a party to the secret reserve agreement, created a
bidding war by hiring away many players from teams in the Na-
tional League.50 Profits plummeted, and teams in both leagues
struggled for financial survival.
Owners in both leagues quickly recognized the impact that
wage competition had on their profits. After the 1882 season, the
two leagues signed a compact that was known as the National
Agreement. 1 This agreement permitted each team to reserve a
stipulated number of players in a manner similar to the first re-
serve agreement.52  The compact prohibited teams from hiring or
attempting to hire players on the reserve list of another team. The
leagues prospered again," and this prosperity again attracted com-
petition. In 1884 a new league, the Union Association, was organ-
ized "specifically to fight the 'outrageous' reserve rule. ' 54 Although
the Union Association hired many good players from the existing
leagues, popular interest in baseball was not sufficient to support
three leagues with thirty-four clubs. Consequently, the new league
failed after one season of play.5
Baseball's prosperity prompted the formation of employee or-
ganizations as well as the creation of new leagues.5" In the fall of
By abolishing the reserve ule [sic] the new league thinks it will get a hold on the
best baseball talent in the country ....
A New Baseball League, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1889, reprinted in TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 43, at 4.
50. J. ROSENBURG, supra note 46, at 26.
51. Id.
52. The compact initially permitted team owners to place five players on the reserve
list. This number later increased to fourteen players, which was nearly the entire comple-
ment of players for a team. Professional Sports: Has Antitrust Killed the Goose that Laid
the Golden Egg?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 290, 292 (1976) (remarks by Mr. Koppett at the pro-
gram on the application of antitrust laws to professional sports, annual meeting of the ABA
section on antitrust law) [hereinafter cited as Professional Sports].
53. Attendance figures rose dramatically during the 1883 season. See H. TURKIN & S.
THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 16; Koppett, Reserve Clause Breeds Bitterness, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1970, § 5, at 2, col. 2, reprinted in TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 43, at 157-58.
The National Agreement resulted in a more equitable distribution of talented players and
eliminated the costly bidding wars for players. From 1881 through 1890 the number of team
failures sharply declined. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 24-25;
Comment, supra note 36, at 586.
54. H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 16.
55. See Koppett, supra note 53.
56. The monopoly power of the leagues after the National Agreement led to many
abuses. For example, in 1885 the leagues voted to limit salaries to $2,000 and to eliminate
salary advances. See HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 31; J. Ro-
SENBURG, supra note 46, at 28. These measures led to hardship for many players because of
the seasonal nature of employment. Moreover, the salary ceiling was approximately one-half
of the salary that star players of the day had been earning. See Koppett, supra note 53. In
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1885 players from the New York Giants organized the first union
of professional athletes, the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball
Players.57 Other clubs followed and created chapters of the union.
The primary goal and impetus for formation of the organization
was the abolition of the reserve system.58 By the end of the 1887
season, the fledgling organization had one hundred members and
demanded an end to minimum player salaries and the reserve sys-
tem, as well as recognition as the players' bargaining representa-
tive. The owners refused and retaliated with a player classification
plan. Under this plan owners unilaterally set players' salaries up to
a maximum salary of $2,500.59 Owners forced the players to assent
to the classification plan under threat of blacklisting. Leaders of
the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players responded by
creating yet another new league-the Players' League. 0 On Nov-
ember 4, 1889, the Players' League issued a "Declaration of Inde-
pendence"61 and began a truculent campaign against the estab-
lished leagues with some initial success.62 The New York franchise
of the National League, the Metropolitan Exhibition Company,
lost several players to the Players' League and filed suit to enjoin
its players from joining the new league. The court in Metropolitan
Exhibition Co. v. Ewing3 held that the reserve clause bound a
player to a team vis-h-vis other teams in the National and Ameri-
can Leagues, but did not prevent a player's employment in a new
league. The drafter of the reserve clause, A. G. Mills, who was
president of the National League when the National Agreement
was adopted, later concurred with the Ewing court's conclusion.
addition, team owners imposed fines and suspensions for minor violations. One owner fined
a player for failing to tip his hat. See J. ROSENBURO, supra note 46, at 28.
57. J. ROSENBURG, supra note 46, at 28.
58. Salary limitations, the reserve rule, and other perceived abuses "brought the smol-
dering resentment of the players into the open." HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL,
supra note 34, at 32. John Montgomery Ward, an early leader of the Brotherhood of Profes-
sional Baseball Players, wrote in an open letter to the president of the'National League that
the reserve rule was "a fugitive slave law." Id. See L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 267.
59. J. ROSENBURG, supra note 46, at 31.
60. Id. at 31-32. The union considered the possibility of striking on July 4, 1889. The
players, however, feared a loss of public support and attempted instead to negotiate with
the owners. The team owners refused to negotiate with the union. Koppett, supra note 38,
at 90.
61. H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 41.
62. The Players' League established teams in seven of the eight National League cities
and scheduled games for the same dates and times as National League games. Moreover,
nearly two-thirds of the National League's approximately one hundred players signed with
teams in the Players' League. Koppett, supra note 38, at 90.
63. 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
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The "reserve rule," as I formulated it for the use of the clubs of our
alliance, placed its obligation upon clubs, and prohibiting them from employ-
ing or negotiating with players reserved to other clubs; the penalties pre-
scribed for the violation of such reserve rule were placed upon the clubs and
the Association of which they were members, and not upon the players, who
were not parties to the compact.Y
Subsequent courts similarly were unwilling to prevent players
from abrogating their contracts. In the majority of cases courts de-
nied petitioning clubs equitable relief on grounds that the underly-
ing contract lacked mutuality or definiteness or that the contract
was an impermissible restraint on trade."5 Since courts were reluc-
tant to enforce the reserve provisions of players' contracts, team
owners entered into agreements among themselves to restrain their
players. For example, team owners reached a no-tampering agree-
ment, which they enforced by threats of fines and forfeitures of
games." Moreover, owners agreed to blacklist players who did con-
tract with other teams.67
The 1891 season was a financial disaster for all three leagues.68
Although the Players' League drew more attendance than either
the National League or American Association, s it nonetheless did
not survive. Disagreements arose between the National League and
the American Association when teams from each league attempted
to sign players from the defunct Players' League. In 1891 the
American Association withdrew from the National Agreement and
began to recruit players from the National League.7 0 Four of the
American Association's most profitable franchises, however, moved
to the National League. This move increased the size of the Na-
64. L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 88 (quoting HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL,
supra note 34, at 34).
65. See Comment, supra note 36, at 588-90. State courts in New York and Pennsylva-
nia refused to restrain players from leaving their reserving clubs to join the Players' League
on the grounds that the reserve clause was indefinite, lacking in mutuality, and unconscion-
able. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1914) (lack of mutuality and common-law restraint on trade); Metropolitan Exhibition
Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N. Cas. 393, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd.
v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. 57 (C.P. 1890). In Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) a federal court denied injunctive relief to the club on the ground that
the reserve clause was only a "contract to make a contract if the parties can agree." Id. at
204.
66. Housa REPORT ON ORGANIZzD BASEALL, supra note 34, at 35; Comment, supra
note 36, at 591. For an explanation of no-tampering agreements, see supra note 27.
67. Comment, supra note 36, at 591-92.
68. See HousE RzoRT ON ORGANIZZD BAsEBALL, supra note 34, at 35.
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tional League to twelve teams and resulted in the failure of the
American Association.71 For the next nine years the National
League operated without a rival league.72 This monopoly position
again resulted in abuses. Owners unilaterally decreased players'
salaries as much as forty percent and on occasion withheld players'
salaries for relatively minor infractions.7 '
The National League's next challenge came from the Ameri-
can League, which was organized in 1900. The American League
recruited many National League players because of the willingness
of American League team owners to pay salaries in excess of the
National League limit of $2,500.7" In 1903 team owners in the two
leagues concluded that cooperation was necessary for their pros-
perity and established the National Baseball Agreement. The
agreement provided for a player draft and stated:
Contracts with players must be respected under the penalties specified.
The right and title of a major league club to its players shall be absolute, and
can only be terminated by release or failure to reserve under the terms of the
agreement by the club to which a player has been under contract.7 5
This agreement brought stability and prosperity to the teams once
again.
In 1913 the Federal League was organized with teams in
Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Baltimore, St. Louis, Kansas City,
Indianapolis, and Chicago. 6 After the two established leagues re-
71. See J. ROSENBURO, supra note 46, at 33-34.
72. Interestingly, the National League in 1892 instituted a split season to spark
greater fan interest. The winner of the first half of the season played the winner of the
second half to determine competitors in the World Series. This procedure was remarkably
similar to the playoff system that the leagues adopted after the 1981 strike. See H. TURKIN
& S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 501-02.
73. J. RoSENBURG, supra note 46, at 38. Amos Rusie, after leading the National League
in strikeouts for six successive seasons and winning 24 games for New York in 1895, had his
salary reduced from $3,500 to $3,400. House REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note
34, at 36. In 1894 a group of promoters announced their intention to revive the American
Association. Two managers and a player in the National League were among these promot-
ers. The three men were given six weeks to abandon their plan or face permanent expulsion
from organized baseball. House REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 37 (cit-
ing N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1894, at 9, col. 7).
74. Cy Young, Jimmie Collins, Clark Griffith, and Napolean Lajoie were among the
players who moved from the National League to the American League at this time. H.
TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 18. The National League franchise in Philadel-
phia went to court and successfully prevented Lajoie from playing for Connie Mack's rival
Philadelphia Athletics. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
75. National Baseball Agreement, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1903, at 15, col. 3, reprinted
in TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 43, at 4.
76. Unlike the Union Association and the Players' League, which arose as a result of
reform platforms, businessmen formed the Federal League solely as a capital investment.
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fused to permit the Federal League to become a party to the Na-
tional Agreement, the Federal League responded by recruiting
players from the National League and the American League." The
two established leagues retaliated by blacklisting any player who
moved to the new league. Attendance was low for the Federal
League teams. 78 Moreover, the three leagues suffered from the in-
creased number of teams as well as a general economic depression
and the advent of World War 1.79 In December 1915 the Federal
League owners reached an agreement with owners in the National
League and the American League that effectively ended the new
league's existence.80 Under this agreement owners in the National
League and the American League paid the Federal League owners
to dissolve the new league."' The agreement permitted some Fed-
eral League team owners to purchase existing franchises in the Na-
tional League and the American League.2 The agreement also gave
See H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 41.
77. Of the 264 players who played in the Federal League during the 1914 and 1915
seasons, only 43 were not under contract to any club in the American or National Leagues at
the time they signed with the Federal League. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL,
supra note 34, at 55; L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 2.
On January 18, 1914, The New York Times declared: "The high-water mark in the
frenzied finance of baseball was reached with the Federal League's big offer to 'Ty' Cobb of
$15,000 a year for five years. Cobb last year was the highest salaried outfielder in the game,
receiving $12,000 from Detroit." Baseball Salaries Reach Top Mark, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,
1914, § 4, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in TIMEs ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 43, at 17. In a revealing
display of journalistic license the article continued:
The recent activity of the outlaw league in threatening to invade the territory of the
major league clubs has given an artificial impetus to the salaries of baseball players.
Experienced baseball men say that the high salaries which are now being offered are
absurd, in contrast to the profits made in baseball, and that when the reaction comes,
the result will be the loss of a great deal of money by club owners .... During the
Brotherhood trouble and during the American League raid, the value of baseball play-
ers jumped considerably, and the price has been going up ever since.
Id.
78. HOUSE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 56.
79. Id.; L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 3. Losses from Federal League operations reached
$2,500,000 by the end of 1915. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 56.
80. L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 4. An article in The New York Times stated: "The
most disastrous war that the baseball game has ever experienced came to a close here to-
night when a treaty of peace between the Federal League and both parties to the national
baseball agreement, known as Organized Baseball, was signed." Long Baseball War is Set-
tled, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1915, at 10, col. 1, reprinted in TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
43, at 19.
81. The major leagues agreed to pay Federal League backers $600,000 in return for
dissolution of the Federal League. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at
56.
82. The agreement permitted the Chicago Federals to purchase the Chicago Cubs and
the St. Louis Federals to buy out the St. Louis Browns. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASE-
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all blacklisted players amnesty and permitted the Federal League
teams to assign their contracts with players to teams in the estab-
lished leagues. 8
B. Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws: Federal
Baseball and its Progeny
The Federal League agreement denied the Baltimore Federal
League club the opportunity to purchase the St. Louis Cardinals. 4
Subsequently, the leagues excluded the Baltimore franchise from
the settlement agreement altogether.8 5 In response, the Baltimore
club filed suit under the Sherman Act86 alleging that both the re-
serve clause in the player contracts and blacklisting maneuvers,
which the owners used to enforce the clause, constituted unlawful
restraints on trade. These mechanisms, the club claimed, had pre-
vented the Federal League from hiring quality players and, there-
fore, diminished the attractiveness of its games. As a result, at-
tendance declined, and the league ultimately failed. The trial court
found that the National League and the American League had en-
gaged in unlawful monopolistic practices and awarded $240,000 in
damages to the Baltimore club.8 7 On appeal, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed, 8 and the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the reversal.8 9 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, con-
cluded that, although teams crossed state lines to play for money,
baseball games "are purely state affairs."90 Moreover, the sport is
not "trade or commerce" for purposes of the Sherman Act.91
Therefore, the Sherman Act did not apply to the restrictive prac-
tices of the leagues.92 The Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Baseball removed all legal obstacles to the continued maintenance
BALL, supra note 34, at 56-57.
83. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 57.
84. The reasons why National League club owners refused to consent to the sale are
unclear. Baltimore's 1910 population exceeded the respective populations of Washington,
Detroit, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. Moreover, St. Louis was having difficulty supporting two
teams. Id.
85. Id.; L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 4.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
87. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more, Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1921), afl'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
88. 269 F. at 682.
89. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id. at 209.
92. Id. at 208-09.
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of the reserve system and sustained the system against all chal-
lenges for an additional fifty years.
Players, however, continued to resent the system. In 1946 sev-
eral players from the Pittsburgh Pirates organized the American
Baseball Guild. The players sought collective bargaining with the
management of the Pittsburgh franchise. Upon a petition for an
election among Pirate players, the National Labor Relations
Board, consistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Federal
Baseball, determined that baseball was not "commerce" within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act." Team owners,
however, reacted to the effort by making several concessions to the
players, including the adoption of a minimum salary, the establish-
ment of a pension fund, and the shortening of the spring training
period. 4
During that same year the Mexican League began to recruit
from the National League and the American League. 5 In a chal-
lenge to the reserve system by a player who was blacklisted for
jumping his contract to play in the Mexican League, Judge Frank's
concurring opinion in Gardella v. Chandler" recognized that the
Supreme Court had broadened considerably the definition of "in-
terstate" activities and "trade or commerce" for purposes of the
Sherman Act during the intervening years since Federal Base-
93. Although the case never was reported officially, The New York Times noted that
the Board denied jurisdiction because baseball was not "commerce" within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Pennsylvania Labor Board Orders Pirates'
Election on Guild Aug. 20, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1946, at 25, col. 3; see L. SOBEL, supra note
32, at 271. Cf. Hoffman, Is the NLRB Going to Play the Ball Game?, 20 LAB. L.J. 239, 244
(1969). Subsequently, players rejected the American Baseball Guild in an election held
under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board. Krasnow & Levy, supra
note 37, at 763.
94. H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 44, at 24; see L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at
272; Maher, Players' Association: A United Front ... To Face Owners, L.A. Times, Feb.
12, 1973, § 3, at 6, col. 2. The New York Times reported:
The most elaborate and complicated pension program ever undertaken by a pro-
fessional sport was adopted yesterday when the National and American Leagues...
agreed to a plan assuring veteran baseball players an income ranging from $50 to $100
per month on reaching fifty years of age.
It was estimated yesterday that the ball clubs will carry approximately 80 percent
of the burden of upkeep, thereby yielding another signal victory to the players who,
when they started their movement for better working conditions last year, included a
pension request among their demands.
Drebinger, Pension Program for Players Voted by Major Leagues, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1947,
§ 5, at 1, col. 1.
95. House REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 77.
96. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
19821 1147
HeinOnline -- 35 Vand. L. Rev.  1147 1982
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1131
ball9 7 Thus, Justice Holmes' conclusion in Federal Baseball that
the Sherman Act did not apply to professional baseball was no
longer tenable.9 8 Judge Frank voted to remand the case to the trial
court and opined that plaintiff's allegations, if proven, demon-
strated that baseball was "a monopoly which, in its effect on ball-
players like the plaintiff, possesses characteristics shockingly re-
pugnant to moral principles that, at least since the War Between
the States, have been basic in America."9 Gardella ultimately was
settled before the Supreme Court could reconsider the Federal
Baseball holding. Encouraged by Judge Frank's opinion, other
players nevertheless challenged on antitrust grounds various as-
pects of the reserve system.100 The Supreme Court in Toolson v.
New York Yankees, Inc.,101 however, reaffirmed its holding in Fed-
eral Baseball and maintained baseball's exemption from the Sher-
man Act. For nearly twenty more years the reserve system contin-
ued to operate quietly.102
97. Id. at 412 (Frank, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 408-09 (Frank J., concurring).
99. Id. at 409 (Frank, J., concurring).
100. See Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.), aff'd
sub noma. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Martin v. Chandler, 85 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
101. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). Toolson was a consolidation of cases in which players chal-
lenged the reserve system on antitrust grounds. Plaintiff baseball player was assigned by one
team to another in the Yankee "farm" system. He refused to report to the new team and
was placed on an ineligible list. As a result, he was barred from playing baseball. See Tool-
son v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 200 F.2d
198 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). After its consideration of the case, the Su-
preme Court ruled:
We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of
the antitrust laws it should be by legislation. Without re-examination of the underlying
issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.
346 U.S. at 357. For a criticism of the Toolson holding, see L. SOBELx, supra note 32, at 26-
29.
102. The quiet operation was interrupted in 1959 when Branch Rickey proposed to
organize a third league, the Continental League. At the same time a congressional subcom-
mittee was conducting hearings on Senator Kefauver's bill to remove the antitrust exemp-
tion from baseball. When Congress did not adopt the measure, the impetus behind the pro-
posed league failed. "Again, Organized Baseball adapted to the nascent pressure by the
expansion of the American League and then the National League for the first time since
1899 to include franchises in several of the cities for which Continental League teams were
proposed." H. TURKIN & S. THO.MPSON, supra note 44, at 26. The New York Times reported
the proposal of the third league:
After more than half a century as a two-league operation, big-time baseball this
week was faced with the prospect of a third major league. .. . The third league, with
founding teams in New York, Houston, Denver, Toronto, and . . .Minneapolis-St.
1148
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In 1969 the St. Louis Cardinals traded player Curt Flood
against his wishes to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood challenged
the trade and argued that the reserve system and players' lack of
contractual freedom constituted an unlawful restraint of trade.
The Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn'0 s reaffirmed baseball's im-
munity from antitrust restrictions. The Flood decision made base-
ball unique, not only in American industry generally, but also
among professional sports. The Court in Flood acknowledged that
the narrow definition of interstate commerce utilized by the Fed-
eral Baseball Court was no longer valid, and that baseball, as an
industry, was "engaged in" interstate commerce.'0 Moreover, the
Court noted that it previously had found boxing 05 and footballP10
to be within the purview of the Sherman Act. 0 7 The Court, how-
ever, refused to overrule Federal Baseball, reasoning that Con-
gress, although fully aware of the case, had failed, nonetheless, to
remove the exemption from the antitrust laws in the fifty years
since that decision. 08
Court decisions in the 1970s struck down many player re-
straints on antitrust grounds, including the reserve systems in foot-
ball, 09 basketball,1 0 and hockey.11' Nevertheless, the decision in
Flood meant that the antitrust laws were not the method by which
baseball players, unlike their counterparts in other major sports,
could obtain greater contractual freedom. When the Court reaf-
firmed baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws in Flood, all
Paul, expects to begin operating as an eight, ten or even a twelve-team circuit by 1961.
3rd League Hurls Curve at Majors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1959, at E8, col. 5, reprinted in
TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 43, at 123-24.
103. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
104. Id. at 282.
105. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
106. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
107. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 276-80, 282. Justice Douglas, sitting alone in Haywood
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (Douglas, Circuit Justice), held that bas-
ketball was subject to the antitrust laws. See also Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n,
389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Similarly, the court in Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), held that hockey
was within the purview of the antitrust laws. See Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp.,
1958 Trade Cas. 1 69,106 (S.D.N.Y.).
108. 407 U.S. at 283-84.
109. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975).
110. See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
111. See, e.g., Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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the elements of the reserve system-the draft, the no-tampering
rule, and the reserve clause-remained intact.
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES OF AGE
A. Early History of the Players' Association: Strike One
The absence of redress under the antitrust laws for players
subject to the restraints of the reserve system led many commenta-
tors to urge the use of concerted activity and collective bargaining
as a countervailing force to the power of the owners:
Since the professional athlete has been able to do little when faced with
the monopolistic activities of the owners which have resulted in harsh con-
tract provisions and sub-standard working conditions, it would appear that
the logical course of action is to experiment with collective action as the pos-
sible answer to the professional athlete's problems.112
Other commentators viewed the imbalance of bargaining power be-
tween the owners and the individual player as an evil that "must
be eliminated if the professional sports world is to avoid a total
breakdown in labor-management relations."' ' These observers
suggested that the players' associations affiliate with national labor
organizations to gain expertise and wider influence. 114
The difficulties, however, of organizing professional athletes
appeared to make unionization impracticable, and most observers
were doubtful of the success of a unionizing effort.11 5 Employment
in the industry, some commentators argued, depended entirely
upon individual ability." 6 Athletes as a class tended to be individ-
ualistic and motivated by rewards other than monetary gain."
Other critics noted that "[b]all playing is a calling brief in dura-
tion, migratory and seasonal in character." 1 8 Organizing and col-
lective bargaining, therefore, would be unusually difficult. Public
opinion, according to some observers, opposed the unionization of
112. Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 759.
113. See, e.g., Note, supra note 37, at 459.
114. See, e.g., Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 774-76; Note, supra note 37, at 479-
80.
115. See Keith, Developments in the Application of Antitrust Laws to Professional
Team Sports, 10 HASTNGS L.J. 119, 136 (1958); Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports,
58 YALE L.J. 691, 711-12 (1949); Note, Baseball and the Law-Yesterday and Today, 32 VA.
L. REv. 1164, 1175 (1946); Comment, supra note 36, at 635.
116. See Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 759-60; Note, supra note 37, at 474; Com-
ment, supra note 36, at 635.
117. See Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 760.
118. Comment, supra note 36, at 635.
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professional athletes." 9 Resort to a work stoppage not only would
alienate the public but, because of the seasonal nature of the in-
dustry, also would hurt financially weak teams.'2 0 Indeed, players
considered and rejected affiliation with a national union out of fear
of damaging their public image or antagonizing owners.' 2' Al-
though organizations of players existed in professional team sports,
none was a bona fide labor organization engaging in collective bar-
gaining.122 Skeptics cited the American Baseball Guild fiasco 1 23 as
an example of the futility of organizational efforts.2 4
In response to the threat of unionization in 1946, team owners
had implemented a representation plan.1' 5 Owners, however, lim-
ited representation to providing a means for communicating play-
ers' suggestions and complaints.12 6 Players would "then await
whatever action the club owners are willing to take.' 2 7 The Major
League Players' Association, which had formed in 1954, operated
solely as this kind of conduit for information, without even a full
time executive officer for more than a decade. During its early
years the Players' Association was neither a union nor a collective
bargaining agent.' 8 Indeed, the Players' Association itself denied
any intention to establish a union.' Commentators criticized the
inadequacy of the representative system: "In short, the representa-
tive system in baseball is a form of company unionism in which the
player representatives are afforded an opportunity to air their
grievances on a league-wide basis. . . . Unfortunately, reliance on
119. See id. at 635-36.
120. See id.
121. See Note, supra note 37, at 479; Comment, supra note 36, at 628.
122. L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 267-72; Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 762, 771.
123. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
124. See Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 762; Note, Arbitration of Grievance and
Salary Disputes in Professional Baseball: Evolution of a System of Private Law, 60 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1049, 1053 (1975).
125. See L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 272; Maher, Player's Ass'n: A United Front...
To Face Owners, L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1973, § 3, at 8, col. 1.
126. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 176; see L. SOBEL,
supra note 32, at 272-73.
127. HOUSE REPORT ON ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 34, at 176.
128. Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 771. The relationship between owners and
players was characterized as "paternalistic." Shulman & Baum, Collective Bargaining in
Professional Athletics-The NFL Money Bowl, 50 CH. BAR REC. 173 (1969).
129. Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1964); Krasnow & Levy, supra
note 37, at 771. Professional athletes, like many other professional, managerial, and techni-
cal employees, often prefer not to be identified as trade union members. See Berry & Gould,
A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls & Strikes, 31
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 687 & n.2, 688 & n.3 (1981).
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owner benevolence is a rather tenuous solution to the long-range
problems in the area."130
The Players' Association gradually evolved from its earlier sta-
tus as an information exchange group to a bona fide labor organi-
zation. In 1966 the Association named Marvin Miller, former chief
economic advisor and assistant to the President of the United
Steelworkers of America, as the executive director of the Associa-
tion."'1 Early concerted union activity occurred in 1969 when play-
ers and managment could not reach agreement on the funding of
the players' pension plan. Most players boycotted spring training
camps."3 2 Labor and management exchanged charges and threats
of economic sanctions' before the commissioner of baseball inter-
vened to settle the controversy."3
The Association's position as a representative organization re-
ceived further impetus in December 1969 when the National Labor
Relations Board indirectly approved the organization's collective
bargaining status. The NLRB in American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs and Association of National Baseball League
Umpires 35 reversed the position it had taken in 1946 and held
that professional baseball was an industry "in or affecting inter-
state commerce."' ' Remarkably, the NLRB decision occurred
three years before the Supreme Court in Flood found that baseball
was an industry that affected interstate commerce. This decision
subjected the principals of professional baseball to the protections
and requirements of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3 7
Among its mandates the NLRA requires labor and management to
130. Krasnow & Levy, supra note 37, at 772.
131. L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 273; Note, supra note 124, at 1053; Maher, supra note
125, at 8. Many commentators have recognized the appointment of Miller as a signal event
in the development of the organization as a viable collective bargaining organization. See
Professional Sports, supra note 52, at 306.
132. Players Seek Owners' Compromise on Baseball Pension, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1969, at 41, col. 1.
133. J. WEIsTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 780. The players charged that the
owners caused the delay to test the resolve of the players. The owners said that, if neces-
sary, they would play the exhibition season as well as the regular season with minor league
players. Id.
134. Id.
135. 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
136. Id. at 191.
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). The NLRA provides in pertinent part that employees
have the "right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
1152 [Vol. 35:1131
HeinOnline -- 35 Vand. L. Rev.  1152 1982
1982] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1153
bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of employment.138
For professional baseball players the reserve system unquestion-
ably was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 13 9 In 1972 the Players'
Association confronted the owners in the first test of the organiza-
tion's strength and the owners' resolve. Several months before the
Supreme Court's decision in Flood, players undertook the first in-
dustry-wide strike, demanding an increase in pensions.1 40 After a
thirteen day work stoppage,1 41 players and team owners reached an
accord that raised the pension contribution of team owners by ap-
proximately $500,000.142
The Supreme Court's decision that year in Flood, however,
left the reserve system wholly intact. The uniform player contract
provided that if the player and the owner did not reach agreement
prior to the commencement of a season, the team had the right
unilaterally to renew the contract and to cut the player's salary by
twenty percent.1 43 The contract further provided that the player
could not play for another team while under contract and that the
team could enjoin the player's contract breach."14  Major league
rules continued to prohibit any league member from negotiating
with a reserved player,1 45 and the player agreed that his team
138. Id. § 158(a)(5).
139. Jacobs and Winter observed: "We find it difficult to construct even a hypothetical
argument that a contractual provision so intimately connected with determining the team
for which an athlete will play and what salary and other benefits he may extract through
bargaining is not a term and condition of employment." Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Princi-
ples and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L.J. 1, 10-11
(1971). See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
140. J. WEisTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 13, at 781.
141. The players contended that the owners' purpose was to punish the players by
making them "eat dirt" and "bend down and kiss the shoes of the owners." Players' Offer Is
Rejected; Long Strike Seems Likely, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1972, at 49, col. 6. Players also
alleged that the owners had terminated several players because of their union activity. Base-
ball Owners Reject an Offer, id., Apr. 8, 1972, at 19, col. 5. Some commentators argued that
the strike was to preserve the "dignity" of the players. J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra
note 13, at 781 n.39.
142. Baseball Strike is Settled; Season to Open Tomorrow, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1972,
at 1, col. 6.
143. Uniform Player's Contract, clause 10(a), reprinted in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 259-61 n.1 (1972). The Uniform Player's Contract further provided that Player could be
assigned by Club to any other club, id. clause 6(a), and that Club would be entitled to
injunctive relief to prevent Player from playing baseball for any other organization, id.
clause 4(a). See Flood in the Land of Antitrust, supra note 36, at 543-44.
144. Uniform Player's Contract, clauses 4(a) & 5(a), reprinted in Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. at 259-61 n.1.
145. Rule 3(g) of the Major League Rules provided:
(g) TAMPERING. To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent the entice-
HeinOnline -- 35 Vand. L. Rev.  1153 1982
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
could assign him to another team without his consent.146 Moreover,
although the NLRA obligated team owners to bargain with the
Players' Association 147 over the reserve system, the duty to bargain
does not require the parties to reach an agreement. The duty to
bargain dictates only that parties "enter into negotiations with an
open and fair mind and with a sincere desire to reach a mutual
basis for agreement. ' 148 Therefore, the owners lawfully could con-
tinue to bargain to an impasse over the reserve system without
modifying their position.
Although the owners had no legal duty to change the system,
by October 1973 the players had sufficient bargaining strength to
force the team owners to agree finally to some alterations of the
reserve system. As part of a new three year accord between the
owners and the Players' Association, the owners agreed to submit
their salary disputes with the players to binding arbitration.14'
This aspect of the agreement marked "the end of management's
powerful authority to determine salaries unilaterally, leaving a dis-
satisfied player only two options: accept the offer or quit the
game."1 50 Moreover, although the Supreme Court in Flood had
held that the antitrust laws did not prohibit owners from assigning
a player's contract without his consent, the owners, nevertheless,
acceded to an Association proposal giving a player the right to re-
fuse to be traded under certain circumstances.1 51 In announcing
the new agreement, a spokesperson for the owners said that the
new arbitration system "effectively answers . . .[the] most effec-
tive argument against the reserve clause by achieving a balance of
ment of players, coaches, managers and umpires, there shall be no negotiations or deal-
ings respecting employment, either present or prospective, between any player, coach
or manager and any club other than the club with which he is under contract or accept-
ance of terms, or by which he is reserved, or which has the player on its Negotiation
List, or between any umpire and any league other than the league with which he is
under contract... unless the club or league with which he is connected shall have, in
writing, expressly authorized such negotiations or dealings prior to their
commencement.
Flood in the Land of Antitrust, supra note 36, at 543 n.9.
146. Uniform Player's Contract, clause 6(a), reprinted in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at
259-61 n.1.
147. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
148. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S.
514 (1941). See supra note 16.
149. See L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 91-93; Note, supra note 124, at 1067; Bernstein,
Baseball Adopts Plan to Eliminate Holdouts, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1973, § 3, at 1.
150. Bernstein, supra note 149, at § 3, at 1.
151. The veto power applied to players with ten or more years of service and five years
with one club. L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 95-96; Bernstein, supra note 149, at § 3, at 1.
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power between player and club. 1 52 The Players' Association, how-
ever, disagreed with this assessment. The Association argued that
the reserve system continued to restrain player mobility, and it
vowed to lobby Congress to eliminate the reserve system.15 8 Forth-
coming events, however, would shift the balance of power between
player and club and make congressional action unnecessary.
B. The Messersmith Arbitration
The reserve clause historically contained a "renewal year" pro-
vision, which gave team owners the option to renew a player's con-
tract under the terms of the previous contract if the owner and the
player failed to reach agreement on a new contract.1 " Andy Mes-
sersmith, a pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers, played during the
1975 season under the renewal year provision of his contract. Upon
completion of the 1975 season, Messersmith attempted to open ne-
gotiations with other teams. When no club bid for his services,
Messersmith filed a grievance with the Players' Association, and
the union took his complaint through the grievance procedure. '
The Players' Association alleged before the arbitrator that the
baseball clubs had "conspired to deny Mr. Messersmith [his right
to contract] and [had] maintained the position that the Los Ange-
les Club is still exclusively entitled to his services. "'M The renewal
clause, according to the Players' Association, gave the Dodgers the
right to renew the contract for one additional year only. The Dodg-
ers and the leagues argued that when a team renewed a player's
contract "on the same terms" as the previous contract, the re-
152. Bernstein, supra note 149, at 10, col. 3 (quoting John J. Gaherin, head of the
Player Relations Committee for the Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs).
153. Id., at § 3, at 1.
154. The Uniform Player's Contract provided:
"If [prior to the beginning of the season] the Player and the Club have not agreed upon
the terms of [a] contract, . . . the Club shall have the right ... to renew this contract
for the period of one year on the same terms ....
The Club's right to renew this contract ... and the promise of the Player not to
play otherwise than with the Club have been taken into consideration in determining
[the Player's compensation].
Uniform Player's Contract, clauses 10(a) & (b), reprinted in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 259-
61 n.1.
155. Article X of the Collective Bargaining Contract contained the grievance proce-
dure. This procedure defined "grievance" as "a complaint which involves the interpretation
of, or compliance with, the provisions of any agreement between the Association and the
Clubs... or any agreement between a Player and a Club .... "The grievances consisted
of the reserve clauses in the Uniform Player Contracts between the clubs and the grievants.
In re the Twelve Clubs, 66 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 101, 109 n.20 (1975).
156. Id. at 101.
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newed contract contained the right of renewal clause. 157 Thus, in
the owners' view the right of renewal was perpetual. In an opinion
that revblutionized baseball the arbitrator concluded that the re-
newal clause gave a club the right to renew the contract for one
additional year only and did not create a contract with another
renewal clause.158 The arbitrator noted that although contract law
does not prevent parties from entering into perpetual contracts,
the intent to make this type of contract must be express and will
not be implied, particularly when the contract is for personal ser-
vices.15' 9 Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that "Messersmith
was not under contract when his renewal year came to an end" and
was free to negotiate with any team he chose. 60
Many commentators have written about the Messersmith deci-
sion and its revolutionary consequence. 611 The propriety of the ar-
bitrator's decision, however, is questionable. An arbitrator's role in
contract interpretation is, among other things, to determine the in-
tent of the parties when they executed the contract.
The rule primarily to be observed in the construction of written agree-
ments is that the interpreter must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the
mutual intent of the parties....
In determining the intent of the parties, inquiry is made as to what the
language meant to the parties when the agreement was written. It is this
meaning that governs, not the meaning that can be possibly read into the
language.1 62
When Messersmith contracted with the Dodgers, both parties cer-
tainly believed that the language in question embodied the reserve
system as it had always operated.
Since the issue before [the arbitrator] was purely one of contract inter-
pretation, one might ask why the arbitrator did not give greater weight to the
fact that it has historically been assumed that baseball's right to renew was
perpetual in nature. It is generally accepted that particular terms of a con-
tract are to be interpreted consistent with the customs and usages which the
parties have developed under it.1s
157. Id. at 112-13.
158. Id. at 114.
159. Id. at 113.
160. Id. at 114.
161. See Comment, Nearly a Century in Reserve: Organized Baseball, Collective Bar-
gaining and the Antitrust Exemption Enter the 80's, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 313, 338 (1981).
"The result [of the decision and free agency] was an unprecedented increase in salaries. In
1976... the average salary was $52,300. By 1980 it had risen to $143,756 .... "Kaplan,
supra note 23, at 17, 18.
162. F. ELKOURI & H. ELKOURI, How ARBIrrRATION WORKS 202-03 (3d ed. 1973).
163. J. WEIsTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, at 518-19 (footnotes omitted); see A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 544-45 & 556-58 (1951). Moreover, the Restatement (Sec-
[Vol. 35:11311156
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The reserve system had bound the players to teams in perpetuity
since the early years of baseball. Moreover, the arbitrator noted
that when the contract was executed in 1973, the Players' Associa-
tion had acquiesced to the renewal year provision "reluctantly."1"
If the parties had believed only one year after the Flood decision
that the contract eliminated the reserve system and thereafter
would bind the players only for one additional year, the Players'
Association assent would not have been "reluctant." Indeed, such a
contract would have achieved the goal of player contractual free-
dom that the players had sought for nearly a century through
court action,165 the creation of new leagues,1" and strikes. 67 Not-
withstanding these years of conflict, the arbitrator concluded that
the parties did not intend to bind the players in perpetuity.1"e The
decision thus reversed a century of baseball history and fundamen-
tally changed the relationship between the owner and the player.
By limiting the reserve period to one year, the decision greatly di-
minished the owners' overwhelming contractual advantage. The
pendulum, for the first time, had swung to the players.
ond) of Contracts sets forth the following standards for contract interpretation:
§ 201. WHOSE MEANING PREVAILS
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or
a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of
them if at the time the agreement was made
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by ... the first
party;, or
(b) that party h~d no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
RzSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 201 (1979).
164. In re the Twelve Clubs, 66 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 101, 107 (1975).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 84-111.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 43-83.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42; infra text accompanying notes 172-
80.
168. The arbitrator protested too much when he wrote:
It deserves emphasis that this decision strikes no blow emancipating players from
claimed serfdom or involuntary servitude such as was alleged in the Flood case. It does
not condemn the Reserve System presently in force on constitutional or moral grounds.
It does not counsel or require that the System be changed to suit the predilections or
preferences of an arbitrator acting as a Philosopher-King intent upon imposing his own
personal brand of industrial justice on the parties. It does no more than seek to inter-
pret and apply provisions that are in the agreements of the parties .... To go beyond
this would be an act of quasi-judicial arrogance!
In re the Twelve Clubs, 66 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 101, 112 (1975).
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C. Strike Two
What antitrust attacks on the reserve system restraints had
done for the players in the other major professional sports, the
Messersmith arbitration decision did for baseball players: it pro-
vided a major boost to their union's efforts and "forced the owners
to engage in good faith, arms-length negotiations ...concerning
these restraints and all other aspects of player-management rela-
tions. ' 16 9 In the first contract negotiated after Messersmith, the
owners for the first time found themselves attempting to persuade
the players of the need for some form of reserve system. The Play-
ers' Association and the owners agreed to a new system under
which a player would be bound to a team for six years instead of
becoming a free agent after only one year. 17 0 During each year of
the last three years of that period the player and the owner would
negotiate compensation terms. If the parties were unable to agree,
the player could take his claim to an arbitrator, who would deter-
mine whether the owner's proposal or the player's demand more
closely represented the player's relative value. After the six-year
contract period had elapsed the player would become a free agent
and any team desiring his services and willing to enter the bidding
could select him. This new system still would require the team that
acquired the player to give up a draft choice to the player's former
team.171 Nevertheless, the new contract replaced the historic re-
serve system and gave the players freedom of movement for the
first time in nearly a century.
The 1976 collective bargaining contract expired on December
31, 1979. During negotiations for a new contract the owners pro-
posed that the club losing a free agent should receive greater com-
pensation than simply a draft choice. Under the owners' proposal
the club that a free agent left would have a limited right to select a
player from the team that signed the free agent. A team could ex-
empt fifteen players from selection, leaving ten players eligible for
169. Note, supra note 26, at 670; see Comment, supra note 161, at 340.
170. 1976 Baseball Basic Agreement, Art. XVII, B(2), reprinted in Comment, supra
note 161, at 358; see Berry & Gould, supra note 129, at 777; Kaplan, supra note 23, at 18.
171. 1976 Baseball Basic Agreement, Art. XVII C(2)(c), reprinted in Comment, supra
note 161, at 362; see Berry & Gould, supra note 129, at 778; Kaplan, supra note 23, at 18.
Commentators noted the significance of the contract: "Baseball's owners and players
reached agreement today on a four-year pact that for the first time gives the players free-
dom of movement .... The agreement . . . replaces the so-called reserve system which
throughout the baseball history has restricted a player to one club traded, sold or released
him." New Baseball Contract Limits Reserve System, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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selection by the club that the free agent had left.172 Negotiations
over this issue stalled, and on April 1, 1980, the players struck for
the second time in a decade. The players walked out of spring
training camps, forcing cancellation of the final eight days and
ninety-two games of the exhibition season. 17 The players agreed to
return for the commencement of the season, but voted to strike on
May 23, 1980, unless they reached agreement with the owners.174
On May 23 the parties reached an accord on all issues except free
agent compensation, 175 which they referred to a player-manage-
ment committee for further study.17 6 Under the May 23 agreement
the owners reserved the right to implement unilaterally their final
version of the compensation scheme if the parties were unable to
agree on the free agent compensation issue.1 Similarly, the play-
ers reserved the right to strike over the issue.
The team owners implemented their free agent compensation
plan on February 19, 1981, after the player-management commit-
tee failed to reach a compromise. 17 8 On February 25, 1981, the
Players' Association executive board approved a May 29, 1981,
strike date.179 Subsequently, the NLRB attempted to enjoin the
implementation of the owners' compensation scheme. 80 Finally, on
June 12, 1981, the players struck for the third time in nine years.
The third strike was truly a watershed event in baseball labor-
management relations. The 1981 strike and the negotiated settle-
ment completed the transformation of dispute resolution in base-
ball-particularly over the reserve system issue-to collective
bargaining.
172. Comment, supra note 161, at 350.
173. Note, supra note 26, at 681; Kaplan, supra note 23, at 17-21.
174. Chronology of the Baseball Strike, supra note 22, at 18, col. 4.
175. Id.; see Comment, supra note 161 at 351.
176. Chronology of the Baseball Strike, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 18, col. 4.
177. This element of the agreement actually gained no more for the owners than the
law already permitted. Under the NLRA management may implement its last best offer if
the parties reach an impasse during collective bargaining negotiations. Taft Broadcasting
Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), enforced sub nom. AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964). See R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT
ON LAnOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 445-46 (1976).
178. Chronology of the Baseball Strike, supra note 22, at 18, col. 4.
179. Id.
180. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1981, at D21, col. 4. Judge Henry F. Werker ruled that
"there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed."
Id.; see supra note 5.
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IV. THE IRRELEVANCY OF ANTITRUST
Baseball's antitrust exemption, created in Federal Baseball's'
and reaffirmed in Toolson and Flood,182 permits baseball-alone
among professional sports-to operate freely as a monopoly.
Courts,183 commentators,"" members of Congress,185 and players'
have criticized the reserve system restraints. Moreover, commenta-
tors have criticized Flood on both legal and policy grounds. 87
Widespread recognition existed that the reserve system restraints
clearly would violate the antitrust laws but for the baseball exemp-
tion. Antitrust challenges in all other major professional team
sports were responsible for fundamental restructuring of player re-
straint systems during the 1970's. Invalidation of player restraint
systems in case after case under the Sherman Act in other profes-
sional sports88 forced owners to engage in good faith collective
bargaining with the associations that represent their players.'89 As
a result, major changes in the player restraint systems in football,
basketball, and hockey occurred during the 1970's. Nevertheless,
antitrust law, not collective bargaining, provided the impetus for
181. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
183. See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949); supra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text. One court said: "The quasi peonage of baseball players under the opera-
tions [sic] of this plan and agreement is contrary to the spirit of American institutions and
is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.. . . "American League Baseball Club v. Chase,
86 Misc. 441, 465, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 19 (1914) (emphasis in original).
184. See supra note 34.
185. See, e.g., Professional Baseball: Hearings on S.2373 Before the Subcomm. on An-
titrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971)
(remarks of Sen. Ervin).
186. See, e.g., C. FLOOD, THE WAY IT IS (1971).
187. See L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 66-72 (calling the decision a misapplication of
stare decisis and an inappropriate reliance on testimony that owners would not have in-
vested in teams but for the exemption); Comment, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The
Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 737 (1971) (emphasizing that al-
though Congress has refused to enact legislation bringing baseball within the antitrust laws,
it has also refused specifically to sanction the exemption); Comment, Antitrust
Law-Baseball Reserve System-Concerted Conspiracy-Stare Decisis-Congressional In-
action-Professional Baseball Remains Exempt from State and Federal Antitrust Stat-
utes, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 460 (1972) (criticizing the Court for accepting the owners' com-
petitive balance theory while rejecting it in Radovich); see also Allison, supra note 31; Note,
Applicability of Antitrust Laws to Baseball, 2 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 299 (1972); see generally
Berry & Gould, supra note 129, at 729 & n.129 (discussing criticism of the courts' reliance
on stare decisis as the basis of baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws).
188. See, e.g., Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 1958
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,106 (S.D.N.Y.) (hockey).
189. See Note, supra note 26, at 670.
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the restructuring of the player restraint systems in these sports.
One commentator observed, "[C]ollective bargaining on the re-
straints themselves was a joke. There never would have been a dis-
cussion about the draft, the reserve clause, or the Rozelle rule, be-
tween the leagues and the players had it not been for the antitrust
laws, period, exclamation point."19 0 Baseball players, however,
could not use antitrust law to relax player restraints because of the
Flood decision. Without the antitrust option players faced a closely
knit monopoly of employers who were free to fix conditions of em-
ployment. Thus, baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws left
collective action as the players' only recourse.
A. Congressional Inaction
Congress has considered bills that addressed the role of anti-
trust law in professional sports on many occasions. Between 1951
and 1965 members of Congress introduced more than sixty bills on
this issue.1' 1 Some bills would have exempted all professional
sports from the antitrust laws; 192 other proposals would have in-
cluded baseball within the antitrust laws.19s Finally, some bills em-
braced compromise approaches."" One bill, for example, subjected
professional sports to coverage of the antitrust statutes but ex-
empted certain practices that legislators considered essential to the
successful operation of professional sports. 19 5 Another legislative
approach subjected professional sports to the antitrust laws, but
empowered courts to permit certain practices under a rule of
reason.
196
Congress did not adopt any of these proposals. This refusal to
extend the coverage of the antitrust laws to professional sports in
part reflected a consensus that some form of restraint on player
190. Professional Sports, supra note 52, at 307.
191. Hoffman, supra note 93, at 241.
192. See, e.g., H.R. 5383, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. 4229, H.R. 4230, H.R.
4231, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
193. See, e.g., H.R. 5307, H.R. 5319, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
194. See H.R. 6876, H.R. 6877, H.R. 8023, H.R. 8124, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
195. H.R. Res. 10378, introduced by Congressman Celler, expressly exempted activi-
ties that were "reasonably necessary" to equalize competitive playing strengths, to grant
exclusive franchise territories, and to preserve public confidence in the integrity of profes-
sional sports. See Organized Professional Team Sports: Hearings on S. 616 and S. 886
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
196. See Hearings on H.R. 5307, H.R. 5319, H.R. 5383, H.R. 6876, H.R. 8023, and H.R.
8124 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st
Seas. 2 (1957); L. SOBEL, supra note 32, at 38.
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mobility was essential to the survival of league sports.19 7 Moreover,
the reticence of Congress to tamper with the internal regulation of
sports, and particularly baseball, unquestionably reflected the sac-
rosanct position that baseball holds in the United States. Through-
out the debates on these measures members of Congress demon-
strated a marked preference for intrasport dispute resolution:
Constant intervention in their affairs by paternalistic do-gooders will
lead to nothing but trouble for all concerned. In our view, the policy decisions
of sports should be made by people in sports-the owners and players alike.
They should not be made by men in black robes who may never have been to
a ball park.""
The 1981 strike and negotiated settlement only can amplify this
congressional reluctance to interfere in the internal workings of the
baseball industry. Both labor and management, having attained
relative parity in bargaining power, appear fully capable of pro-
tecting the interests of employees and the owners without the need
for antitrust measures to alter the rules of employment.
B. The Labor Exemption and its Application to the
Negotiated Reserve System
The 1981 strike and negotiated resolution effectively ends de-
bate over whether the antitrust laws should apply to baseball's re-
serve system. The reserve system now has been subjected to rigor-
ous collective bargaining. As a result, even if Congress or the courts
removed baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws, the labor
exemption to the antitrust laws would foreclose an antitrust chal-
lenge now brought by a player dissatisfied by the restraints of the
reserve system.19
The labor exemption represents an attempt to reconcile two
important national policies that under some circumstances are in-
herently at odds. The purpose of antitrust legislation is to foster
competition in the marketplace.200 National labor policy, however,
197. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 26, at 580.
198. H.R. REP. No. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Ses. 12 (1958).
199. Congressional efforts to remove baseball's exemption have continued. During the
summer of 1981, broadcaster Howard Cosell and baseball team owner Ted Turner among
others testified before a congressional committee that no justifications existed for the con-
tinued exemption. See L.A. Times, July 17, 1981, § IH at 4, col. 1; id., July 16, 1981, § Il at
4, col. 1; id., July 15, 1981, § I1 at 5, col. 1.
200. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) ("The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945) ("[Antitrust policy] . . .seeks to preserve a competitive
business economy."); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OP THE LAw OF ANTITRusT 14 (1977) ("The
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reflects a congressional assessment that individual bargaining with
employers creates an inequality of bargaining power that "pre-
vent[s] the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions between industries." 0' 1 The preamble to the NLRA sets
forth the intention of Congress to protect unions and to encourage
collective bargaining:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce. . . by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the exercise by working of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the pur-
pose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
202
As a result, unions, in pursuit of improved terms and condi-
tions of employment for employees, have negotiated and struck for
contracts establishing uniform wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. One effect of the uniform provisions is that competition in
the labor market is eliminated. °0 In addition, union activity has
restricted competition in the product market to the extent that la-
bor costs determine product prices.0 4 Thus, unions and their legit-
imate goals are, by their nature, anticompetitive. 05
The Supreme Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.
3, IBEW20 6 succinctly stated the conflict that the courts face when
attempting to fashion an accomodation between labor and anti-
trust policies:
[W]e have two declared congresssional policies which it is our responsi-
bility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business
economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its
conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine
here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neu-
tralize the results envisioned by the other.207
purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition and to inhibit monopoly and re-
straints upon freedom of trade in all sectors of the economy to which these laws apply.").
See Fried & Crabtree, Labor, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 38 (1967).
201. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
202. Id.
203. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. Rzv.
317, 317-18 (1966).
204. A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 872 (9th ed.
1981).
205. "In short, unionization, collective bargaining and standardization of wages and
working conditions are inherently inconsistent with many of the assumptions at the heart of
anti-trust policy." Id. at 872.
206. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
207. Id. at 806.
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Courts created the labor exemption to the antitrust laws to harmo-
nize these conflicting policies. Under the labor exemption doctrine
courts, in certain circumstances, will not subject agreements about
wages, hours, and conditions of employment that employers and
unions have reached through collective bargaining to antitrust
scrutiny.208
Commentators first advocated application of the labor exemp-
tion to immunize collectively bargained player restraint systems
from the antitrust laws at the time Flood was pending before the
Supreme Court. Michael Jacobs and Professor Winter in a seminal
article argued that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari im-
providently in Flood. °9 Since the team owners and the Players'
Association had engaged in collective bargaining regarding a
mandatory term or condition of employment-in this case the re-
serve system-as required by the labor laws, Jacobs and Winter
opined that antitrust policy should be subordinate to labor policy
favoring collective bargaining.2 10 To conclude otherwise, they ar-
gued, would threaten two fundamental tenets of labor law: "the
exclusive power of the bargaining agent and freedom of contract
between employer and union."21 Supreme Court precedent had
held clearly that the courts should invoke the antitrust laws only
when employers conspired to utilize their collective bargaining re-
lationship as a sword to injure competitors.2 2 A conspiracy of this
208. The labor exemption to the antitrust laws is a subject that has engaged many of
the nation's leading labor and antitrust scholars. The focus of the treatment in this Article
is solely upon the application of the doctrine to player restraint systems in professional
team sports. A partial list of important writings on the labor exemption to the antitrust laws
includes: Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (pts. 1 & 2), 39 COLUM. L. REV.
1283 (1939), 40 COLUM. L. REV. 14 (1940); Cox, Labor and Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary
Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955); Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the
Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1981);
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
659 (1965); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L.
REy. 603 (1976); Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Brad-
ley, 13 LAB. L.J. 957 (1962); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Applica-
tion of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14 (1963).
209. Jacobs & Winter, supra note 139, at 29. For a discussion of Flood v. Kuhn, see
supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
210. Jacobs & Winter, supra note 139, at 29.
211. Id. at 6.
212. Id. at 26 (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea,
381 U.S. 676 (1965); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945)). Subsequently, the Court in Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), proved this conclusion
unfounded. In Connell Construction the union pressured the employer to agree to subcon-
tract certain work only to firms who were signatory to collective bargaining contracts with
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type, Jacobs and Winter argued, was not present in Flood, which
concerned the reserve clause-"strictly a labor market issue.
213
The Supreme Court's adherence to Federal Baseball and
Toolson in Flood made any consideration of the labor exemption
unnecessary. Justice Marshall, however, referred to the labor ex-
emption in his dissent in Flood, finding it inapposite to that case:
There is a surface appeal to respondents' argument that petitioner's sole
remedy lies in filing a claim with the National Labor Relations Board, but
this argument is premised on the notion that management and labor have
agreed to accept the reserve clause. This notion is contradicted, in part, by
the record in this case. Petitioner suggests that the reserve system was thrust
upon the players by the owners and that the recently formed players' union
has not had time to modify or eradicate it. If this is true, the question arises
as to whether there would then be any exemption from the antitrust laws in
this case.21 4
Although the Supreme Court did not rely on the labor exemp-
tion doctrine in Flood, the other professional sports leagues uti-
lized the defense in subsequent player challenges to their reserve
systems. During the 1970's the players in other professional team
sports repeatedly challenged player restraint systems. 15 In each of
these actions the leagues invoked the labor exemption to preserve
the player restraint systems. For example, in Mackey v. National
Football League218 present and former players challenged the free
agent compensation structure of the National Football League.
The free agent provision, commonly known as the Rozelle Rule,
permitted the commissioner of the National Football League to
designate the compensation to be awarded to a team losing a free
agent from the team hiring that athlete. 217 "The case developed
the union. Simultaneously, it disavowed any interest in representing the employer's employ-
ees. The Supreme Court held the agreement outside of the labor exemption notwithstanding
that the employer had made no effort to utilize its collective bargaining relationship to re-
strain competition in the product market.
213. Jacobs & Winter, supra note 139, at 27.
214. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (football); Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), remanded, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976) (football); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (basketball); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(football); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F.
Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972) (hockey).
216. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
217. The Rozelle Rule stated:
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall thereupon be-
come a free agent and shall no longer be considered a member of the team of that club
following the expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player, becoming a free
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into a major test for the labor exemption question. Unlike the...
prior sports cases in which the exemption question was decided in
preliminary proceedings, the district court opinion in Mackey fol-
lowed a full evidentiary trial on the antitrust issues." 1 s The dis-
trict court found that the Rozelle Rule constituted an unreasona-
ble restraint on trade.2 1 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit set forth a
three-pronged test to determine the applicability of the labor ex-
emption in the context of antitrust challenges to player restraints:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be
given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade pri-
marily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Sec-
ond, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to
the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement
sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
1 0
The court found that the Rozelle Rule had no appreciable impact
outside the bargaining unit and that it affected "only the parties to
the agreements sought to be exempted. '22 1 Moreover, team com-
pensation for the loss of a free agent fell within the definition of
wages, hours, and working conditions and, therefore, was a
mandatory subject of bargaining.222 The League's claim of immu-
nity under the labor exemption, however, failed the third prong of
the court's test because the Rozelle Rule had not been the subject
agent in such manner, thereafter signs a contract with a different club in the League,
then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the two
League clubs, the Commissioner may name and then award to the former club one or
more players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection
choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair and
equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. 12.1(H), reprinted in
J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 13, at 502-03, n. 167.
218. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 13, § 5.06, at 575.
219. The district court held the Rozelle Rule to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act as well as impermissable under the rule of reason test. Mackey v. National Football
League, 407 F. Supp. at 1007-08. The court found that the Rozelle Rule effectively deterred
clubs from signing free agents, id. at 1006-07, and thus, was "substantially identical" to a
perpetual reserve system, id. at 1006. Under the rule of reason analysis the district court
found the rule (1) unreasonably broad because it affected all players, not merely those
whose movement might upset competitive balance; (2) unreasonable in its failure to provide
procedures to inform players of negotiations for his services and to protect against a current
employer's unreasonable actions which might discourage trades; (3) unreasonable in its du-
ration; and (4) unreasonable in conjunction with other anticompetitive practices of defen-
dants. Id. at 1007-08.
220. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d at 614 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 615.
222. Id.
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of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.222 Thus, the exemption from
coverage of the antitrust laws would not promote collective bar-
gaining under the circumstances of Mackey.24
After the Mackey decision the League and the Players' Associ-
ation negotiated an agreement over the free agent compensation
issue.225 In a subsequent challenge to this agreement, the Eighth
Circuit again considered the application of the labor exemption to
player restraints.
We emphasize today, as we did in Mackey... that the subject of player
movement restrictions is a proper one for resolution in the collective bargain-
ing context. When so resolved, as it appears to have been in the current col-
lective bargaining agreement, the labor exemption to antitrust attack applies,
and the merits of the bargaining agreement are not an issue for court
determination. '"
The Sixth Circuit in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.2 2 7 re-
cently addressed the application of the labor exemption to negoti-
ated player restraints. In 1976 the National Hockey League and
the Hockey Players' Association negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement that provided for an "equalization payment" or free
agent compensation rule. In McCourt the league assigned plaintiff
player to a new team as compensation against his wishes, and
plaintiff challenged the equalization payment rule as violative of
the antitrust laws. The National Hockey League argued that the
labor exemption immunized the provision from antitrust scru-
tiny.222 The trial court found that the equalization payment rule
had been imposed unilaterally upon the Players' Association and,
therefore, failed the third prong of the Mackey test.229 On appeal
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the labor
exemption was applicable to the equalization payment provision.3 0
The court agreed that Mackey sets forth the proper standard to
determine whether the labor exemption is applicable in a given
case.23 1 The court, however, concluded that the equalization pay-
223. Id. at 615-16.
224. Id.
225. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir. 1978).
226. Id. at 289. In this case fifteen active and one inactive NFL players objected to the
settlement agreement between the NFL and the National Football League Players' Associa-
tion following the Mackey decision.
227. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
228. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd,
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
229. Id. For the Mackey test, see text accompanying note 220.
230. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d at 1203.
231. Id. at 1198.
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ment provision was the product of collective bargaining:
[T]he trial court failed to recognize the well established principle that
nothing in the labor law compels either party negotiating over mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining to yield on its initial bargaining position.
Good faith bargaining is all that is required. That the position of one party
on an issue prevails unchanged does not mandate the conclusion that there
was no collective bargaining over the issue."'
The court found that the equalization payment provision was the
product of arm's length bargaining and, therefore, that it was im-
mune from antitrust interdiction under the labor exemption
doctrine.
The Mackey-McCourt standard for the application of the la-
bor exemption in the context of player restraints represents an ac-
comodation of the collective bargaining process within the anti-
trust laws. Continued application of this doctrine, however, leads
to the conclusion that future action by Congress or the courts to
bring the baseball player restraint system within the purview of
the antitrust laws is now unnecessary. The reserve system is a
mandatory subject of bargaining and primarily affects only the
parties to the agreement. Arm's length collective bargaining is
shaping the contours of the reserve system in professional baseball.
Thus, the negotiated format of the reserve system restraints is ap-
propriately immune from antitrust scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1981 strike was the third work stoppage in the history of
baseball and the first to come in midseason. The strike was costly
to the players, the owners, related businesses, the cities, and, of
course, the followers of the game. After seven weeks of often bitter
negotiations, management and labor finally reached a resolution of
the issues. Because of the events of the 1981 strike, collective bar-
gaining will shape the contours of the reserve system, with all of
the costs and periodic dislocations that attend this system of dis-
pute resolution. Congressional action, which advocates sought in
order to bring baseball within the antitrust laws, is no longer nec-
essary. Moreover, the labor exemption from the antitrust laws
clearly would foreclose attack by dissatisfied players even if the
courts or Congress revoked the historic exemption. The application
of the antitrust laws to the reserve system "is an issue whose time
232. Id. at 1200.
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has come and gone. 2 33 Collective bargaining has come of age in
the United States' national pastime. In that arena alone players
and management will carry on the historic conflict over the reserve
system.
233. Jacobs & Winter, supra note 139, at 1.
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